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CHAPTER 10
Evidence and Policy in Aid-Dependent 
Settings
Justin Parkhurst, Siobhan Leir, Helen Walls, 
Elisa Vecchione, and Marco Liverani
IntroductIon
As has been noted in earlier chapters of this book, comparative institu-
tional analyses can be particularly difficult when national contexts differ 
widely. As such, identifying common features in the political or institu-
tional contexts across different settings can be important. One highly rel-
evant contextual feature that is shared across a range of lower income 
settings is the presence, and potential influence, of international donor 
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agencies (or ‘aid’ agencies) that provide funding and assistance to recipi-
ent governments (often classified as ‘Official Development Assistance’ or 
ODA). Of course, there are a wide variety of aid modalities and relation-
ships with these agencies in recipient country settings. International 
donors can be bilateral or multilateral in their orientation (i.e.  representing 
specific governments or collections of countries); they may be private phil-
anthropic (e.g. foundations like the Rockefeller Foundation or Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation); or issue-specific aid mechanisms (e.g. the 
Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; or Gavi  – the 
Vaccine Alliance).
In many parts of the world, aid provision and donor relationships have 
been seen to have historical strategic and political origins (Van Belle 2004). 
Lancaster (2008), for instance, argues that most aid – particularly from the 
US – originated out of cold war diplomacy. While McDougall (2011) argues 
that Australia’s aid programme has aimed to improve security in the pacific 
region. Yet while each country’s arrangements, and historical engagement, 
with donors will have its own unique features, for comparative analyses it can 
be a useful starting point to consider shared experiences involved when out-
side agencies provide financial support for social policies and public services 
in recipient countries. The role of donors in the use of evidence to inform 
health policy was thus identified as a theme in three of the GRIP-Health 
programme case study countries, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Ghana, where 
levels of donor assistance (in terms of net Official Development Assistance) 
were, respectively, 5.1%, 6.5%, and 3.0% of gross national income, at the time 
of our research (according to 2014 World Bank estimates (World Bank)).
Concerns have been raised, particularly in the international develop-
ment literature, about the influence that donors may have over domestic 
policy agendas, policy decisions, and governance arrangements through 
the aid relationship. Development scholars have often taken a critical 
stance towards conditionality attached to aid and policy-based lending, in 
part for its imposition on the sovereignty of recipient countries to make 
their own policy choices (c.f. Koeberle 2003; Mosley et al. 1995). In the 
health sector, for instance, Okuonzi and Macrae (1995) ask the funda-
mental question of ‘whose policy is it anyway?’ to challenge the influence 
donors had over priority setting in health in Uganda. Outside the specific 
confines of health, Chabal (1992) has argued that:
Aid has become an integral part of state policy that is the state takes aid into 
account when devising and implementing policies. Insofar as it is account-
able, then, the state must in part be accountable to outside constituencies 
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(donors). Accountability here means that the state meets the conditions 
under which aid is delivered. Because dependence (aid) is now so central to 
the survival and operation of African states, accountability to aid-donors is a 
priority even if it is at the expense of accountability to domestic constituen-
cies. (p. 243)
Conditionality was particularly strongly enforced during the structural 
adjustment reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, but more recently, there has 
been a retreat from direct conditions placed on aid.1 Yet concerns remain 
over the ways in which donor influence can undermine state sovereignty, 
alter political priorities, or impose new power relationships in less explicit, 
but equally important ways. Swedlund (2013), for instance, evaluates the 
shift from project based (so-called ‘vertical’) funding to budgetary sup-
port (often termed ‘horizontal’ funding) in Rwanda and Tanzania to 
assess if this approach has reduced donor policy influence. He finds that, 
contrary to popular opinion, donors were also using general budgetary 
support as a mechanism to shape local policy priorities.
In addition to concerns about influence over policy priorities and 
choices, some development scholars critique how the international com-
munity has fundamentally shaped the governing institutions of low-income 
countries. The historical legacy of colonialism has provided a starting 
point for some authors to consider how it provided the political, institu-
tional and administrative bases for the construction of the post-colonial 
state (c.f. Chazan et al. 1999; Mamdani 1997). It is also well known that 
international financial institutions and donors have played a major role in 
steering political and institutional development in some countries, explic-
itly linking the provision of foreign aid with political reform and constitu-
tional change (Stokke 2013). While approaches to international 
development have changed over the past two decades, with increasing 
emphasis on the importance of national governance and stewardship, 
there are still concerns over external influence on governance structures 
and systems. Harrison (2001) presents the idea of ‘post-conditionality’ as 
a situation in which donor-recipient relationships become more subtle 
than in past conditionality situations (in terms of direct coercion or explicit 
demands for policy decisions in return for aid). Instead, in systems of post- 
conditionality, influence is mediated through more informal yet pervasive 
1 With some notable exceptions, such as the US government’s so-called ‘global gag rule’ 
that refuses to provide aid funding to agencies that inform about abortion services in any 
way, which is repeatedly imposed or rescinded depending on whether a Republican or 
Democrat is elected as President (Crane and Dusenberry 2004).
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practices of administrative guidance, which often embed donor values or 
ideas into decision structures and reflect power imbalances in doing so. 
Harrison explains:
Donors do not just impose conditionalities; they also work in routinized 
fashion at the centre of policy-making. Donor-funded technical assistance 
introduces not new policies but new methodologies of policy design based 
on corporate plans, surveys, and closer budgeting and monitoring tech-
niques. (p. 671)
He further notes that this approach works to establish political relations 
which make the distinction between external and national level actors less 
useful as donors become involved within multiple forms and processes of 
decision making (p.  675). Such insights mirror arguments made by 
Chambers and Pettit (2004) who have described aid as a ‘complex system’ 
in which power relations are reinforced through “[o]rganisational norms 
and procedures, combined with personal behaviour, attitudes and beliefs 
(p. 137).”
Within the realm of global health and development, such arrange-
ments can place into potential conflict two sets of institutions – national 
institutions guided by Ministries of Health, serving local populations, 
and international global health institutions – each with their own differ-
ent accountability mechanisms or ultimate goals. Some examples of this 
have been seen elsewhere. Storeng and Béhague (2014), for instance, 
identified how particular quantitative indicators were embraced or uti-
lised by international maternal health advocates when these helped 
increase the global profile of their preferred health issue (so-called ‘evi-
dence based advocacy’). Béhague et al. (2009) further have explored how 
the dominant ideas of what an ‘evidence based’ policy response should be 
in maternal and neonatal care could impose global policy interests over 
domestic ones, pushing countries to generic interventions over tailored 
implementation strategies and serving to legitimate, rather than inform, 
key policy stakeholders.
Akin to this, Shiffman (2014) has described the advisory role of key 
global health actors and networks as an exercise in ‘epistemic power’ in the 
ways that it establishes the dominance of particular discourses, priorities 
and approaches in health policy agendas in low-income settings without 
necessarily raising questions about the legitimacy or accountability of 
these actors.
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These perspectives thus highlight the salient features of the aid- receiving 
context in which evidence is both generated and used to guide policy 
development. We can use these ideas to specifically investigate the institu-
tionalised organisational norms, procedures, behaviours, attitudes and 
beliefs (to use Chamvers and Pettit’s terms) that are established in each 
setting which shape the utilisation of evidence for health policy decision 
making.
EvIdEncE usE as a PowEr/KnowlEdgE nExus
Despite the existence of a well-established body of both empirical and 
conceptual work exploring how donors influence structures, processes, 
and outcomes of policy decision making, these insights are rarely incorpo-
rated in debates about, and recommendations to support, the use of evi-
dence in the health sector. Many global actors use an overtly technical 
language when referring to the use of evidence, at times mirroring ideas of 
the public health community: presenting evidence as a technical tool that 
is principally discussed in terms of how it improves the efficiency or effec-
tiveness of programmatic planning and implementation (c.f. WHO 2004; 
Yamey and Volmink 2014); and donor funds have increasingly been chan-
nelled to programmes aiming to ‘improve’ evidence use principally based 
on technical arguments (c.f. iDSI undated; UKAid 2014; ODI 2013).
Seeing the role of evidence as simply technical, however, stands in con-
trast to critical scholars who have explored the decidedly political nature of 
evidence utilisation (in both public health and other policy realms). 
Stewart and Smith (2015) for example have recently discussed how par-
ticular ‘evidence tools’ – including systematic reviews, impact assessments 
or economic decision-support tools (such as cost-effectiveness analyses) – 
serve political functions in addition to the provision of technical guidance, 
“primarily in their symbolic value as markers of good decision making”(p. 
415). This includes conveying credibility to external audiences as well as 
providing clear and quantifiable answers to policy questions. Through 
interviews with public health policy stakeholders, Stewart and Smith found 
that these tools reflected a high degree of what Weiss (1979) has described 
as the ‘symbolic’ use of research – providing signals of what might be con-
sidered important, rather than necessarily functioning in the ‘problem 
solving’ or ‘engineering’ roles that many tools are often described as 
representing.
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Ferlie and McGivern (2013) similarly described the field of evidence- 
based medicine in the UK as a ‘power/knowledge nexus’ to explore the 
political implications of promotion of particular ways to utilise evidence to 
inform health decisions. In a separate paper, Ferlie and colleagues explain:
power resides in mundane day to day practices, dominant languages, obedi-
ent and reformed subjects and taken for granted rationalities. Such power is 
seen in neutral rather than critical neo Marxist terms: it can constitute a 
capacity to govern (Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006; Townley, 1998) 
without crude force, domination or exploitation. (Ferlie et al. 2012, p. 340)
In line with the conceptual approach outlined in Chap. 1 of this volume, 
this chapter explores the application of health policy-relevant knowledge as 
an exercise of power, pulling out insights from three country cases  – 
Cambodia, Ghana, and Ethiopia – to explore the use of evidence to inform 
health policy. Our analysis discusses a set of key themes seen in the mecha-
nisms through which donors may influence policy and politics through 
evidence utilisation, exploring the political and governance implications 
seen arising from international donors’ promotion or utilisation of particu-
lar tools and strategies of evidence application to influence health policy.
comParatIvE analysIs
The remainder of this chapter attempts to draw out themes about how 
donor activities or power relationships can have implications for the use of 
evidence in health policymaking based on our three country investigations 
undertaken in aid-dependent settings. Each of these countries is also rep-
resented in separate chapters of this book, which provide further informa-
tion and lines of analysis. So, for example, Chap. 2 presents a comparison 
of evidence use in Cambodia for three different health policy issues: 
tobacco control, HIV/AIDS, and performance-based financing including 
the Government Midwifery Incentive Scheme. The chapter finds that the 
use of evidence for differing policy issues was best explained by mapping 
out how the various health policy issues differed in terms of the outcomes 
of concern to key stakeholders; but also by exploring the structurally 
established positions of influence that stakeholders had, and the logics 
held by influential stakeholders over which evidence was held to be rele-
vant to any given outcome. Further work arising from our Cambodia 
research (published elsewhere) looked more broadly at the routes through 
which donors could have influence over the health policymaking process 
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(analysed through a comparison of Cambodia and Pakistan). That work 
found that donors could exert influence at each stage of the policy process: 
priority setting, policy formulation, and policy implementation, monitor-
ing and evaluation. The analysis found that direct funding to preferred 
policy issues was the most common means of donor influence, but other 
means of influence arose from control over technical knowledge as well as 
more indirect influence – such as through financing particular research or 
evaluations (thus constructing evidence that could be seen as policy rele-
vant), or through recipient country concerns over maintain a good reputa-
tion to avoid impacts on non-health areas of concern (e.g. tourism or 
trade) (Khan et al. 2018).
Influence over institutions and norms by donors can also be seen in the 
case study from Ghana presented in Chap. 4, which particularly draws out 
the ways that donors could influence the collection of routine data and 
indicators to inform annual performance reviews and subsequent sectoral 
plans. Chapter 3, which presents findings from our Ethiopian case study, 
looked more specifically at the issue of nutrition policy, and found that the 
international community’s framing of nutrition problems and policy 
responses could be important factors in helping to explain how evidence 
was utilised within policymaking processes for that specific issue.
As discussed above, it is important to consider the underlying structural 
governing dynamics in aid-recipient areas to understand donor influence, 
including the organisational norms, procedures, or beliefs held that shap-
ing the generation and utilisation of evidence. Through the three case 
studies in countries reliant on donor support to the health sector, we have 
thus been able to reflect on multiple ways that donor influence can mani-
fest itself within the structures and processes of evidence use for health 
policymaking. In this section we draw out three themes that point to par-
ticular mechanisms though which donor organisations influence the policy 
process: through the creation of policy-relevant evidence; through the 
utilisation of evidence for specific policy processes; and through the con-
struction of systems and routines that shape how evidence informs policy 
within health policymaking more broadly.
The Generation or Creation of Policy Relevant Evidence
Health sector planning typically requires assessments of the health status 
and health care needs of a population as well as knowledge about what is 
feasible or achievable based on different intervention strategies  (Abel- Smith 
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1994; Green 2007). For each of these, however, there may be more or less 
robust bodies of evidence available to provide information about health 
care needs and intervention possibilities. As social epidemiologist Nancy 
Krieger (1992) has stated, “If you don’t ask, you don’t know, and if you 
don’t know, you can’t act (p. 412).” In this way, decisions about which 
data to collect, the identification of a research agenda and the choice of 
research topics can be seen to be inherently political as it shapes the topics 
that enter the agenda, and thus which pathways of policy action can be 
followed (see also: Parkhurst 2016, 2017).
In Cambodia, it was reported that the research agenda and the avail-
ability of routine data from the national health information system are 
driven by external funding, often focused on high profile diseases (such as 
malaria or HIV/AIDS), and this could result in the neglect of other 
important health concerns (with issues like hepatitis, road traffic accidents, 
or dengue fever mentioned). One interviewee further explained that men-
tal health was another key priority in Cambodia, given the historical legacy 
of the genocide perpetuated in the 1970s; yet research and policy atten-
tion to mental health were said to be lacking due to dependence on donor 
agendas (see (Khan et al. 2018) for more details). Similarly, a recent litera-
ture review found that few research reports on non-communicable dis-
eases in Cambodia have been published, despite these accounting for the 
highest morbidity and mortality rates in the country (Goyet et al. 2015).
In Ethiopia, the influence of donors was said to arise through their 
funding to local universities conducting research – through which local 
evidence would then be generated for health topics of interest to donors 
(with nutrition given as an example). Paralleling a respondent in Cambodia, 
an Ethiopian interviewee stated that donor research interests might focus 
on diseases with a high profile on the global health agenda (such as HIV 
or TB) without work on lesser known areas which might be important 
from a national perspective, leading to these topics being overlooked when 
it comes to the drafting of health policies. Research conducted by devel-
opment partners or NGOs was also seen to be valued by decision makers 
more highly than that generated solely by Ethiopian scholars, viewing 
international partners as experts and potentially excluding local sources of 
evidence, and thus local voices, from having influence on policymaking.
Cambodian interviewers noted other ways that donors might influence 
the creation of policy relevant evidence. First, donors were seen as influ-
encing which areas of health information systems were strengthened  – 
thus building capacity to collect and generate routine data for selected 
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areas of health which they prioritised, such as malaria or HIV. Second, 
donor choice in financing of programme evaluations would again affect 
which evidence is created in ways that could shape where future policy 
attention could lie.
Evidence Use Within the Policy Process
A second theme we explore in our case studies focusses on the use of evi-
dence within different health policymaking processes, to consider the roles 
or influence of donor agencies within these more specific policy decision 
situations. One of the most well established (yet often critiqued) mecha-
nisms of donor influence in low-income settings is in the direct funding of 
particular programmes and shaping of national priorities (Buse and 
Harmer 2007; Ooms et al. 2008; Sridhar and Tamashiro 2009). While 
there have been shifts away from such so-called vertical programming, it 
still does occur in many cases, with large numbers of global bodies direct-
ing money to specific health issues. Such arrangements can subsequently 
have direct impacts on evidence use, however, as those issues which 
received funding for programmatic use could have increased attention to, 
or application of, particular forms of evidence.
For example, in Cambodia, we investigated three health (system) topics 
that have recently received policy attention. Of these, it was HIV/AIDS – 
in comparison to tobacco control or financial performance incentives to 
health workers – that respondents typically described as having the most 
robust system to draw on high-quality scientific evidence to guide pro-
grammatic decisions; including epidemiological modelling, cost- 
effectiveness data, and scaling up from pilot programme evaluations. A 
reason given for this, however, was the interest and support of donors to 
HIV/AIDS in the country. This included provision of financial and human 
capacity resources to the bodies planning HIV activities, such as the 
National Centre for HIV/AIDS, Dermatology and STDs.
It may not be surprising that donor interest in HIV enabled a system of 
evidence use judged by local actors to be better than in other health deci-
sions. Cambodia has limited human resources for the generation and anal-
ysis of policy-relevant evidence. In the other two cases explored in Chap. 
2, powerful national interests were seen as dominating the framing of the 
policy question, which subsequently affected which pieces of evidence 
were held to be relevant or applied. With the case of tobacco policy, it was 
industry and national revenue interests that influenced which evidence 
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could be brought to bear; while the Prime Minister’s office’s direct inter-
est in maternal mortality was seen to shape how a midwifery incentive 
scheme was conceptualised and how it subsequently used evidence. In the 
case of HIV/AIDS policy in Cambodia, some saw this as presenting a 
positive development given the limited or piecemeal application of evi-
dence to inform decisions for other health issues. But there are still chal-
lenges in the fact that it might only be a sub-set of issues for which there 
is a robust enough body of evidence generated, reviewed, or applied to 
justify international interest and funding.
Furthermore, while it was financing of interventions, and of research 
on priority topics, that affected evidence use for the agenda-setting stage, 
donors were also seen to have influence on the policy formulation stage in 
Cambodia. At this stage, influence was seen to derive from donor profi-
ciency in analysing data and using research outputs to inform policies and 
plans, or in filling knowledge gaps that might exist – either by commis-
sioning additional research or using their own expertise.
Another example of how international actors may have political influ-
ence within specific health policy issues can be seen in Ethiopia. Chapter 3 
presents a case study of nutrition planning, exploring how the conceptual 
framing of nutrition by the global community had implications for how 
particular evidence could inform policy development. For instance it was 
explained that international stakeholders and processes, including a 2008 
Lancet special series on maternal and child undernutrition, led to a com-
mon understanding of a need to address nutrition through a multi- sectoral 
approach. Yet the implications of this were that particular forms of evi-
dence resonated with particular institutionalised logics of appropriateness 
and were not appropriate for the logics of others, thus hampering efforts 
to achieve multisectoral policy to address nutrition.
So, for example, it was reported that the Ministry of Agriculture pursued 
a logic dictated by concern over farm outputs, while the Finance Ministry 
considered monetary data to justify action from an economic development 
perspective  – in contrast to the typical public health indicators (such as 
under-five mortality or obesity rates) that are institutionally understood and 
used to raise malnutrition awareness and priority in global health circles.
The mention of the Lancet’s 2008 undernutrition series by our inter-
viewees reflects Shiffman’s (2014) recent description of epistemic and 
normative power in global health. Shiffman specifically identifies the 
Lancet as “one of the most powerful actors in global health (p. 298),” in 
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the ways it has worked to set the global agenda and construct ideas of 
what should be done in health. Our research described in Chap. 3 illus-
trates this in practice, showing how a special series of that journal worked 
to shape the conceptual understanding of malnutrition, with subsequent 
implications for which evidence was drawn upon and how to shape policy 
development.
Systems and Routines of Evidence Utilisation
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Harrison’s (2001) analysis of 
‘post-conditionality’ identified how donor influence has shifted to routin-
ised processes of policy design. While Harrison focusses on Uganda and 
Tanzania, he points to a set of other African countries that might fit this 
description (including Ghana). And from a new institutional perspective 
(c.f. Lowndes 2010; Peters 2005), routinisation would be reflected in the 
structures, processes, and norms that shape the use of evidence to inform 
health policy.
For example, the analysis of Ghana presented in Chap. 4 principally 
focusses on an institutional process and system for data utilisation to 
inform health policy and planning  – specifically exploring how routine 
local data and locally relevant research evidence are utilised to populate a 
set of ‘indicators’ that are then used to evaluate health sector achievement 
and inform annual formal sector strategic planning meetings. Using rou-
tine data to inform annual planning cycles is of course not an unusual idea, 
yet it was the specific role of donors in defining indicators, and influencing 
how they were used to assess national policies, that served as mechanisms 
by which donors could collectively shape the development of national 
policy. In particular, it was an annual ‘health summit’ event during which 
indicators were developed and populated with data to judge policy suc-
cess, and steer policy directions for the future.
This example echoes forms of influence described by Whitfield (2007) 
who explains:
Donors exhibit powerful influence over policy not only through condition-
ality, but also through policy dialogue arenas. Donors have created a pleth-
ora of arenas for what they call ‘policy dialogue’ with government, as well as 
for coordinating their operations, sharing information and experience, 
 discussing policies, and identifying opportunities to engage government on 
policy reforms. (p. 145)
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Such policy dialogues can be particularly fertile environments for the 
introduction of ‘evidence’ when conceptualised in a technical problem 
solving manner, with the form, location, and arrangements around such 
dialogues having implications for power and influence within the local 
settings.
In Cambodia, however, there were also examples of structured pro-
cesses and routinised norms that reflected donor influence on the broader 
institutional environment that shaped evidence use within health policy-
making for any number of policy decisions. In Cambodia, for instance, 
one respondent explained that technical reports were typically published 
in English, creating an immediate barrier for some local stakeholders to 
engage with technical evidence. It was also reported that research was 
driven by funding rather than local demand, which could mean available 
research could be less relevant to the country. This shows some similarity 
to issues raised in Ethiopia where it was reported that internationally pro-
duced evidence is more respected than that produced internally by national 
institutions.
dIscussIon: InfluEncE and rEsIstancE ovEr multIPlE 
forms of EvIdEncE usE
The influence of donors in aid-recipient nations has long been a subject of 
interest to development scholars, yet rarely have these issues directly been 
analysed in relation to issues of evidence use within the policy process. Our 
comparative analysis identified a range of examples and themes through 
which donor influence could manifest itself in shaping the way evidence 
was generated or utilised to inform decisions, as well as in the ongoing 
systems or routines that can influence evidence use as well.
As noted in Chap. 1, Carol Weiss described multiple meanings of 
research utilisation in the 1970s (c.f. Weiss 1979)  – including rational 
‘problem solving’ uses of research, but also how research serves a ‘knowl-
edge driven’ role to identify problems in the first place, or to influence 
broader thinking about issues through a so-called ‘enlightenment’ mecha-
nism. The case studies explored in this chapter illustrate examples of evi-
dence and research use fitting each of these meanings. Influence over 
evidence generation, for example, could shape the knowledge construc-
tion process which serves to identify health problems for policy attention 
in the first place. The direct support to priority issues, on the other hand, 
allowed certain topics to have evidence used more robustly in a classic 
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problem solving modality. Influence over broader systems of data use, or 
routinised norms related to expertise and evidence utilisation, on the other 
hand, might alternatively reflect Weiss’ enlightenment ideas.
In these ways we can of course consider donor influence as an exercise 
of power. The historical concern of some authors over donor control of 
resources (i.e. funding) certainly was found to be a major influence on 
which issues received attention, which at times shaped which health issues 
were seen to have had robust or improved evidence utilisation processes as 
well. Yet power also could be seen as present in the expert knowledge and 
capacity in regards to evidence utilisation that international actors pos-
sessed, or were perceived as possessing – so called epistemic power linked 
to scientific expertise.
This said, our country cases also illustrated a number of ways that 
donor power and influence might be resisted – themes particularly dis-
cussed in Ghana and Ethiopia. At the time of the research, Ghana was the 
only one of our three aid-dependent settings classified as a lower-middle 
income country (today Cambodia also falls into this classification), but 
Ghana particularly stood out as having greater local capacity related to 
evidence generation and use than in Ethiopia or Cambodia. Multiple 
respondents in Ghana referred to significant research or evidence genera-
tive capacity in national bodies, including the Ghana Health Service 
(GHS) as well as universities. One interviewee stated that the country 
had a strong desire to be independent from donors in its desire to rely on 
local data for evaluations; and in another case a representative of a UN 
body stated that they choose research topics based on those requested by 
the government.
Notably, there are three well-regarded Health Research Centres within 
the Research and Development Division of the GHS, serving the north-
ern, middle, and southern regions of the country. According to national 
documents, these centres conduct research within their designated sub- 
region as per the needs and priorities of the GHS, this information is then 
used to guide national-level decision making and policy development 
(Ghana Health Service 2015). All centres are also said to have well estab-
lished health and demographic surveillance systems and collaborate with a 
number of international partners and funders (Ghana Health Service 
2015; Navrongo Health Research Centre 2016). In contrast, in Cambodia 
and Ethiopia, there were indications that donors had a strong say over 
which health topics were researched in the first place. Thus the generation 
of policy-relevant data could be seen to follow donor interests with 
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 subsequent implications for policy options. Ghana, however, with its 
higher capacity and better established research and bureaucratic bodies, 
appeared less susceptible to influence in this way.
Despite greater local capacity in Ghana, interviewees still mentioned 
donors could shape policy decisions – achieved through their allocation of 
resources to specific issues, through a national desire to appease donors so 
as to maintain budgets, or even through lobbying for preferred policies. 
One representative of the GHS interviewed noted that there still will be 
priority allocated to issues based on the power of stakeholders – providing 
an example of how breast cancer was addressed before cervical cancer in 
the country, as it affects wealthier individuals, despite representing a lower 
burden of disease in the country. Yet Ghana has been noted elsewhere for 
having established a muti-donor budget support mechanism and associ-
ated policy dialogue mechanism to improve coordination of aid and main-
tain national leadership of policymaking in the face of donor proliferation 
(Pallas et al. 2015). As such there appeared to be a tension between the 
capacity and strength of local decision making systems and the influence of 
donors at multiple points.
In Ethiopia, as noted, local capacity was acknowledged as weak for 
much health planning and decision making. Yet despite the fact that we 
identified influence over evidence creation and framing of issue responses 
by donors and international actors, Ethiopian policymaking and planning 
was understood to be strongly centrally controlled, which seemed to indi-
cate significant resistance to direct influence over decisions or priority set-
ting at times. Indeed, in a recent assessment of potential donor influence 
on policy in Ethiopia over two decades, Borchgrevink (2008) found par-
ticularly strong resistance to influence in the country. A key explanation 
the author gives is how:
the Ethiopian regime is independent-minded, proud, and unwilling to bow 
to the whims and wishes of donors and the international community in 
general. The [ruling coalition] has learnt self-reliance during a long guerrilla 
struggle, has a strong commitment to its own development model with a 
basis in Marxism-Leninism, and a perhaps healthy distrust of the reliability 
of donors. (p. 216)
This, in combination with a lack of donor coordination or consistency 
and the lack of significant threat to change the regime, are used by 
Borchgrevink to explain that “donors have been relatively powerless to 
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influence Ethiopian policies (p. 215).” Indeed, one representative of a UN 
agency stated that it was still the Ethiopian government who decides how 
to use the results of research programmes, for instance, even if research 
was supported externally. This difficulty to influence the government was 
also reflected in several of our interviews, where the strength of the gov-
ernment was seen to limit the influence donors could have – both on pol-
icy agendas, but also on the roles that evidence plays in planning.
Ultimately, insights from multiple countries illustrate balances between 
donor influence and national country resistance or control over policymak-
ing. Agendas could be directly shaped by donor funds, or more indirectly 
influenced through creation of policy-relevant evidence. Yet the extent and 
impact of each of these was contextually determined, influenced by govern-
ment capacity, systems, and control over aspects of decision making in the 
health sector. Strategic forms of resistance to influence would also reflect 
the idea of aid as a ‘game’ situation, explored in earlier work on aid condi-
tionality by Mosely et al. (1995) in which donors and recipients are con-
ceptualised as pursuing different goals, basing behaviour on the expected 
response of the other party and potential trade-offs as a result.
conclusIons
While the use of evidence to inform health policy has often been discussed 
in technical terms, critical policy scholars have noted how such conceptu-
alisations may mask or ignore important aspects of policymaking – includ-
ing how evidence promotion or utilisation risks depoliticising the policy 
process  – both by obscuring the fundamental value-based choices that 
policy makers must consider and trade off, as well as obscuring the gover-
nance implications that may arise from the different ways evidence may be 
used to steer or shape ultimate policy decisions. Exploring these concerns 
through the specific context of aid-dependent settings, however, adds new 
insights into how power dynamics can play out in multiple ways affecting 
not only specific policy decision making, but also through the underlying 
governing institutional structures that shape how evidence is created, 
selected, or interpreted to inform policy decisions.
In our comparative reflection presented above, the political-economy 
of aid and development has been shown to manifest itself through a num-
ber of more or less visible processes of evidence utilisation. Donor agen-
cies not only use evidence to essentially promote desired policy choices 
and agenda topics, but they similarly have influence over which policy- 
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relevant evidence bases are created in the first place by funding research, 
strengthening select routine data sources, or undertaking programmatic 
evaluations of desired interventions. They further have been shown to 
have influence over the ways that pieces of evidence are interpreted in 
decision making fora at times, illustrating the power dynamics within deci-
sions around which evidence is relevant for what policy and planning con-
siderations. Finally, donors at times work to construct institutionalised 
systems and processes, the continuing performance of which may work to 
prioritise particular problems, solutions, or power relationships within the 
health sector. In all these ways we can see the importance of critically 
investigating the power and governance implications of evidence promo-
tion and use, particularly in low and middle income settings which have 
historically had less research in these areas, yet which clearly show impor-
tant dynamics as well due to the political dynamics of the aid donor- 
recipient relationship.
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